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The cost of system operational testing is steadily-
increasing. It is desirable for the software manager to know
if the software is sufficiently well developed or reliable to
support such testing. Current software reliability models
provide only point estimates of the mean time to next failure
or expected number of errors to occur in additional testing
time
.
The goal of this thesis is to take into account prediction
uncertainties of a software reliability model. Bootstrapping
is used to provide the software manager with confidence limits
of the predicted expected number of faults to occur for
additional testing time. The results can be particularly
useful to a software manager who has to answer a subjective
question: is the software reliable enough to support system
operational testing? A range of predicted expected number of
faults will be of more use to a software manager, who has to
justify the answer to this question, than just a point
estimate. Two software fault data sets are analyzed with this
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Prior to costly operational testing of a system consisting
of hardware and its embedded software, it would be highly
desirable to know whether these two major components are
sufficiently reliable to support such testing. Specifically,
this is equivalent to asking whether the software has reached
a state of maturity such that unforeseen faults (bugs, errors,
system crashes, etc.) are not likely to occur during
operational test of the entire system, or later, during a
systemic mission.
Estimation of hardware reliability is relatively well-
understood. Unfortunately, software reliability or maturity
prediction is not as well understood at this time. The
ANSI/IEEE definition of software reliability is the ability of
a program to perform a required function under stated
conditions for a stated period of time (IEEE, 1984) . Since
testing software has an associated cost whether it is in
computer run time, labor costs, lost market share resulting
from late delivery of a product or, in the case of military
equipment, sacrificed range- testing time and aborted missions,
there is a finite time allocated for testing and removal of
faults (bugs) . A moderate- sized program with 264 branches
would have 2 264 independent paths (greater than the estimated
number of atoms in the universe) . Obviously, it is infeasible
to test each path (Dalai and Mallows, 1988) . Testing and
debugging costs are estimated to range from 50% to 80% of the
costs for development of a working version of software
(Beizer, 1984) . The constraints of a finite time period for
testing and the cost of testing are excellent incentives for
prompt and accurate determination of software reliability.
Put in the form of a question: when can testing be stopped
and the product delivered with a high level of confidence that
the customer will be satisfied?
Software reliability estimation is based on the results of
testing. Software testing can be broken down into four major
categories: unit, integration, system and regression testing.
Unit testing is usually done by the programmer in an informal
manner. Integration testing is done in an orderly progression
such that the software elements are combined and tested until
the entire software package has been tested. System testing
is integration of hardware and software to verify that the
system meets specified requirements. Regression testing is
retesting to detect faults that may have been introduced
during program modification (Hernandez, 1989) . One purpose of
testing is to produce quantitative measures of software error-
proneness after effort has been expended in the integration
testing, system testing, and fault removal phases.
Software testing, a follow-on to hardware reliability
prediction has been of considerable importance and interest
from the mid- I960' s to the present. The Navy's Operational
Test and Evaluation Force recently (January, 1992) held a
symposium for DoD agencies to discuss and exchange ideas and
methodologies on software testing and reliability. There are
two basic differences between hardware and software
reliability predictions. Hardware prediction usually assumes
independence of failures, and, after some point, the
reliability measuring process does not affect the failure
rate. Software reliability prediction models should assume
interdependence of unit failures, and that testing improves
reliability. Removing a program fault or bug during
developmental testing reduces the likelihood that a fault will
become operative later in an operational setting that will
cause a mission to abort. The software fault -prevalence and
appearance prediction problem has been judged to be inherently
more difficult than hardware reliability prediction (Beizer,
1984) .
There are several software reliability models that will be
discussed later. Beizer in his seminal work Software System
Testing and Quality Assurance (Beizer, 19 84) summed up the
similarities of the models best.
1. Most models assume a fixed but unknown number of
faults when testing.
2. Faults are universally assumed to be independent (some
of the later models, Schneidewind' s Software Reliability
Model for example, do not necessarily make this
assumption)
.
3. Most models assume perfect debugging. That is, the
debugging process introduces no new faults. However, some
of the later models take into account that not all
detected faults will be fixed, and that the debugging
process itself may introduce new faults (Littlewood and
Verrall 's Bayesian Reliability Growth Model takes into
account imperfect debugging)
.
4. Most models assume that test time and calendar time
are the same.
5. The models assume that failure rate is proportional to
the faults remaining. This implicitly means that faults
are assumed to cause single failures and each failure can
be related to one failure.
6. The models assume path homogeneity. That is, data are
entered randomly and such data uniformly exercise all
code. This is in direct contradiction to the reality that
the most paths cover a small percentage (say under 10%) of
the code.
The difference between the models lies in the degree with
which these assumptions hold true, i.e. the type of random
process according to which the failures occur, and how data is
fitted to the models (Beizer, 1984).
The models that are described in Chapter II do not
necessarily perform well for all types of data. There is no
"silver bullet" (Brooks, 1986) that will take on all comers
successfully. One model may predict reliability well for one
data source but not another. The users of the models must
take into consideration the predictive quality of a model
prior to basing decisions on the output of the model (Abdalla
et al, 1986) and (Goel, 1985) . One possible way to do this is
to analyze the data using various models. The manager selects
the model that demonstrates the best predictive qualities,
i.e. the model that appears to best fit the data and provide
useful results. The choice is difficult because it is
conducted in an atmosphere of uncertainty.
Our hypothesis is that software reliability can be
predicted, but with error. It is important to take account of
the variabilities and uncertainties that are inevitably
present, at least those associated with sampling (finite
data) , the most serious errors may be associated with model
choice, however. To test this hypothesis of predictability we
analyze sources of fault (error or bug) data using a
modification of the BELLCORE MODEL (Dalai and Mallows, 1988)
to estimate the reliability of the particular software project
and the quality of the prediction produced by the model.
Parametric estimates are made by maximum likelihood but also
by use of an approximate Bayesian technique. Error estimates
are made by a re -sampling technique known as bootstrapping.
The parametric bootstrap technique was used in the
aftermath of the Challenger disaster to analyze the 0- rings
that failed. Although the analysis was done on hardware the
methodology that we propose in Chapter III and the appendix is
similar. The analysis of the 0-rings showed the bootstrap 90%
confidence limits expected catastrophic failure rate of at
least 13% at temperature of less than 31 degrees, but less
than a 2% failure rate at temperatures above 60 degrees (Dalai
et al , 1989). Had the NASA decision makers had this
information available to them the consideration to postpone
the launch may have been taken more seriously and the disaster
prevented. The analogy for the software manager to consider
is the predicted number of faults to occur for some specified
time acceptable. It is hoped that, the wrong decision will
not have consequences as severe as the Challenger disaster.
The techniques that we describe provide a quantitative tool
for the software manager to substantiate the decision to
schedule (postpone) system operational testing.
In Chapter II, we briefly describe several software
reliability prediction models that have been proposed in order
to provide a basis of understanding of the discussion. In
Chapter III and the appendix, we present the model fitting
procedure, the method used to determine the quality of the
prediction, the resulting data obtained from the analysis, and
methods to improve this methodology from the perspective of a
software manager. In Chapter IV, our conclusions are provided
and directions for future research are suggested.
II. SURVEY OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY METHODOLOGIES
This survey is concerned with only two categories of
software reliability models: those for time between errors
(TBE) , and for fault count (number of errors in a specified
time)
.
A. TIME BETWEEN ERRORS (TBE)
TBE reliability assessments attempt to predict the mean
time between failure (MTBF) of the ith failure based on that
to the (i-l)th failure. The TBE can be measured in either
central processing unit (CPU) time or wall -clock time. Wall-
clock time can be misleading: it can elapse regardless of
whether or not the program is running. From this information
the software manager can gain confidence that the software
will exhibit the operational capability to complete its
mission: to operate without failure for a mission time. A
system that experiences multiple, severe software errors that
prevent the system from completing its operational mission is
not ready for costly live exercises as in operational testing.
For example, a system that is supposed to detect, track and
engage a missile during a scenario of five minutes' duration,
but whose software experiences a severe fault every thirty
seconds on average, is obviously not ready to conduct an
expensive live exercise or actual mission. Here are some
models that attempt to predict (mean or average) time to
failure.
1. Jelinski and Moranda Model
Jelinski and Moranda developed the "De-Eutrophication
Model" (Moranda and Jelinski, 1972), (Farr, 1983). The
assumptions are:
• The rate of fault detection is proportional to the current
fault content of a program.
• All faults are equally likely to occur and are independent
of each other.
• Each fault is of the same severity as any other fault.
• The fault rate remains constant over the interval between
fault occurrences.
• The software is operated in a manner similar to
anticipated operational usage.
• The faults are corrected instantly, without introduction
of new faults into the program.
The hazard rate for the ith fault is
Zi (t)=B[N-(i-l)] , (2.1)
where: N = total number of faults initially in the system
i = ith fault to occur
= proportionality constant.
X, = t, - t,., is the time between the ith and the (i-l)st fault






The likelihood function for the parameters 6 and N is
L(Xif Xn)=Hni=1 Q[N-(i-l)]e [
'e{N' u '1))Xi]
. (2.3)
Taking the partial derivatives of ln(L) with respect to N (N
is allowed to assume any real value as a convenient
approximation) and 9, and then setting the equations equal to
zero, the solutions for the following set of equations are
obtained as maximum likelihood estimates for N and 9 (N is










The estimate for the mean time between failure (MTBF) for the
(i+l)st fault occurrence is
""'"-zfe-iuhr " <2 " s>
The data required to use the Jelinski-Moranda model are the
observed times of the fault occurrence (t/s), or the times
between the faults (x/s).
2. Schick-Wolverton Model
The hazard rate for the Schick-Wolverton model
(Schick and Wolverton, 1978) and (Farr, 1983) is proportional
to the number of faults in the program and the amount of
testing time. An assumption of the model is that as more
testing is completed the probability of detecting faults
increases because of "zeroing- in" on the areas of code where
the errors lie. The assumptions are:
• The rate of fault detection is proportional to the current
fault content and to the amount of time expended in
testing.
• All faults are equally likely to occur
• All faults are independent of each other
• All faults are of the same severity
• The software is operated in a manner similar to the
anticipated operational usage
• Perfect fault correction occurs.
The hazard function is
Z(Xj) =Q[N-(i-l)]Xi , (2.7)
where: X, = the amount of time spent testing between the
occurrence of the ith and the (i-l)st fault
N = total number of faults initially in the program
9 = proportionality constant.
The reliability function of X, is
X 2
R(Xi )=exv(-6[N-(i-l)]-±) . ( 2 - 8 )
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The density function of X
;
is
[-QIN-U-D] 4r> (2.9)f(Xi )=-R / (Xi )=6[N-(i-l)]Xi e 2 .
If X
;
2/2 is replaced by Y; the model is formally identical to
the Jelinski-Moranda model previously described. In fact,
substitution of any known function of Xj allows transformation





' <2 - 10)
y^ i _Q £i-i Xi (2.ii)
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The data requirements are the time of the fault occurrence, t it
or the time between the ith and (i-l)st fault.
3 . Geometric Model
The Geometric model (Moranda, 19 75) and (Farr, 19 83)
is a modification of the Jelinski-Moranda "De-Eutrophication"
model. It differs from that model as follows: it does not
assume a fixed number of faults in the program, and the faults
are not equally likely to occur because as debugging
11
progresses faults become harder to detect. The assumptions
are:
• There is an infinite number of total faults (the program
is never totally fault free)
.
• All faults do not have the same chance of detection.
• Detections of faults are independent.
• The software is operated in a manner similar to
anticipated operational usage.
• The fault detection rate forms a geometric progression and
is constant between faults.





where: t, = time between the ith and the (i-l)th fault
D = initial hazard rate
8 - fault detection rate (0<8<1)
n = the nth fault to occur.
X, = time between the ith and the (i-l)st fault. The X, are
independently and exponentially distributed with rate Z;(t),














Equation (2.16) is solved for 6, and that value is substituted
into (2.15) to find D. From these equations the MTBF until
the (n+l)st fault occurs after n faults have occurred can be
obtained:
MTBFn+1 =£(Xn+1 )=-^-n . (2.17)
The data requirements are the time of the ith fault (t
;
) , or
the time between the faults (X,), for i = l,2,...,n.
4. Use of Time Between Errors (TBE) Models
The TBE for models in this category can be measured in
either wall -clock time or CPU time. The models may be used to
predict the expected time to the next failure. Confidence
limits on the expected value should be used to obtain a range
of time to the next failure. The software manager should be
asking: is the expected time of next time of failure longer
than the time required for operational testing of the software
within the overall system? If the time required for
operational testing of the system is greater than the mean
time to failure for the (i + l)th failure then the prudent
software manager should consider postponing operational
13
testing in favor of continued developmental activity and
testing.
B. FAULT COUNT MODELS
Fault count models use the number of faults that occurred
in a testing interval to determine the expected number of
faults in the next testing interval. Software managers can
employ this method by simply counting the number of faults in
a given test period i.e. day, week, or month, provided test
exposures are the same. This provides insight into how well
the testing process is working.
1. Generalized Poisson Model
The Generalized Poisson Model (Schafer et al , 1979),
(Farr, 1983) is similar to the Jelinski-Moranda and Schick-
Wolverton models but uses fault count observations in fixed,
equal -length intervals rather than times between faults. The
assumptions are:
• The expected number of faults occurring in any time
interval is proportional to the fault content (number of
bugs remaining) at the time of testing, and to the amount
of time that has been previously spent in testing. The
actual number of faults that appear is assumed to be
Poisson distributed.
• All faults are equally likely to occur and are independent
of each other.
• Each fault is of the same severity.
• The software is operated in a manner similar to the
anticipated operational usage.
14
The faults are corrected at the ends of the testing
intervals. (Note: Faults discovered in one test interval
may be corrected at another test interval; the only-
restriction is that the fault correction come at the end
of the testing intervals.)
Testing intervals are of length x^, and f
;
faults occur during
the ith interval. At the end of the ith interval a total of
M; faults are corrected.
The expected number of faults in the ith interval is
E(fi)=B[N-Mi .1]gi (x1 ,X2 , . . .,x± ) , (2.18)
where: 8 = proportionality constant
N = initial number of faults
g, = function of the amount of testing time spent
previously and currently and is nondecreasing;
as testing progresses more faults are found
specifically,
g1 (x1 ,x2 x1 )=x* , (2.19)
where ex is assumed known,
f, is Poisson with mean = 8(N-M





Y". —^ =6^ g± . (2.21)
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These non- linear equations must be solved for and N. From
this the expected number of errors in the (n+l)st test
interval can be obtained,
E(fn+1 )=B(N-Mn)gn+l (xlf Xn+1 ) , (2.22)
where: xD+1 is the anticipated testing time for the (n+l)st
test interval
.
The data requirements for this model are the lengths of the
test intervals, (x,) , the total number of faults corrected at
the end of a test interval, (M,) , and the number of faults
discovered in each interval (f,) .
2. Non -homogeneous Poisson Process Model
The Non- homogeneous Poisson Process Model (NHPP) (Goel and
Okumoto, 1979) and (Farr, 1983) assumes that the fault counts
for testing intervals follows a Poisson distribution. The
expected number of faults in the Poisson process model is
proportional to the number of faults left in the program. The
assumptions are:
• The software is operated in a manner similar to the
anticipated operational usage.
• The numbers of faults detected, (f,) , in the any test
interval, (t,.,,^), are independent for any finite
collection of times tu <t2 , . . . , tit . . . , t^, ta .
• Faults are of the same severity.
• Faults are equally likely to be detected.
• The cumulative number of faults detected at any time t,
(N(t)), is a Poisson distribution with mean m(t) . The
mean, m(t), is the expected number of faults to occur for
16
any time period (0,t) and is proportional to the expected
number of undetected faults at time t.
m(t) is bounded.
The specific mean function used is
m(t)=a(l-e-bt ) , (2.23)




where: a = expected total number of faults to be
eventually detected,






°Y?^ fijy» f^t^-t^e'^-r (2.26)
From the estimates of a and b the expected number of faults in
the next (m+l)st test interval is estimated to be
m(tml)-m(tm)^(e-£t'-e'£t^) . (2.27)
The data required for this model are the fault counts of each
test interval, (f
;
) and time of the test interval, (t
;
) .
3. Schneidewind' s Software Reliability Model
Schneidewind' s model (Schneidewind, 1975) and (Farr,
1983) maintain that as testing progresses the fault detection
17
process changes. The later faults are therefore more useful
in determining future fault counts. The model allows for
three approaches
.
1. Utilize all the fault counts from the m intervals.
2. The first (s-1) intervals are ignored and only the s
through m interval fault counts are considered.
3. The first (s-1) intervals fault counts are summed, and
the individual fault count from the remaining s through
m intervals are treated individually. Denote the sum of
the fault counts in the first s-1 intervals by:
Fs-i=K~.i fi (2 - 28)
Method 1 is used when the analyst feels that all intervals
will be useful. Method 2 can be used when a significant
change in the fault detection process has occurred at
approximately the (s-l)st interval. Method 3 attempts to
combine the effects of both approaches. The assumptions for
all methods are the same:
• The fault counts for each interval are independent of each
other.
• The fault correction rate is proportional to the number of
faults to be corrected.
• The software is operated in a manner similar to the
anticipated operational usage.
• The mean number of detected faults decreases from one
interval to the next.
• Intervals are all of the same length.
18
The rate of fault detection is proportional to the number
of faults remaining. The fault detection process is
assumed to be a non- homogeneous Poisson process with an
exponentially decreasing appearance and detection rate.





The cumulative mean number of faults that occurs up to and
including interval i is
Di= -| (1-e-^) . (2.30)
The mean number of faults for the ith interval is
mi«£i -fli _i !=4<e (
~P(1 "1))
-e ( "*i) ) • (2.31)











FEL__^l =a f (2.34)
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A=££o (*+i-l)fs+1 . (2-35)
^EL^ • < 2 - 36 >
For Method 2, y is the solution to
Aym- s+2_ (A+FSim ) y*-s
+i+





=KZ lfs*i' < 2 - 38
^.»=EL fi' (2 - 39)
^j=s fl) " (2.40)a =
1-e
For Method 3
, y is the solution to
(s-DFs _lf F£iS _^F^__Ar (241)
y s-1 -l y~l ym-l
where: A is the same as Method 1 and Fg>m is the same as Method
2. From the MLE's of ot and @ the expected number of faults in
the (m+l)st interval is a
E(fw+1 )=-^(e-^-e-^ i+1) ) . (2.42)
20




The data needed for this model are the fault counts for each
interval and a history of testing process in order to
determine the interval that testing procedures may have
altered significantly.
4. Use of Fault Count Models
Fault count models use the number of faults that occur
in some testing interval. The models in this category predict
the expected number of faults to occur in some additional time
interval. Confidence limits on the expected number should be
used to obtain a range of the predicted number of faults to
occur for that time interval. Since there can never be a one
hundred percent guarantee of perfect software, the software
manager should be asking: is the predicted number of faults
to occur for the time interval of interest acceptable for
operational testing? If the predicted number of faults to
occur is too great then the prudent software manager should
postpone operational testing in favor of continued
developmental activity and testing.
C. SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODELS
The number of software reliability models continues to
grow. Assumptions have broadened to reflect the reality of
21
the software development process with increased accuracy. The
assumptions of some models described appear to be limiting.
Faults all of the same severity can be worked around by
modeling faults according to severity. The assumption that
all faults are equally likely to occur and independent of each
other can be resolved by assuming low severity faults occur
more frequently than high severity faults, but faults of the
same severity class will be considered equally likely to
occur. Instantaneous fault correction can be avoided by not
counting faults which were previously detected (and counted at
time of initial detection)
, but were not corrected (Farr,
1983) .
Software managers need to be aware of the limitations and
underling assumptions that underlie the various models that
are available. The data that is needed to fit the models is
critical to reliable results. The data collection needs to be
an accurate reflection of the meaningful historical testing of
the software. Some of the data that should be collected is
computer usage time, testing intensity, extent of the software
that was tested (was the entire system tested or just a
particular module), and milestones in the software's
development (are requirements changed or added midway through
the development of the software?) and, of course, the cost of
testing.
This study illustrates the use of a particular reliability
model. Some of the specific questions that this thesis
22
addresses are: How is a software reliability model used?
What type of information does a model require? What kind of
decision can a software manager make based on the results of
the reliability model?
In today's fiscal environment software managers should
have a "warm fuzzy feeling" substantiated by quantitative
results for their product prior to initiating costly full




The model that is applied in this thesis is based on the
assumption that the rate of error occurrence is a non-
stationary Poisson process (NSPP) (Dalai and Mallows, 1988)
.
The model is identical to the Schneidewind model, and is
fitted according to Method 1, which assumes that all fault
data is of equal value. Let N(t) be the number of faults that
occur in (0,t); where t is software running time. The







where X (t ) =X (l-e"Mt ) . A test time, t 8 , was chosen. This length
of time is divided into periods of length A = t,/J; where J is
the total number of intervals. The jth interval is such that
(
j
- 1) A<t< jA. The number of observed counts (faults) in the
jth interval is nj. The probability distribution for the





}=e~ kJ Lll - , ^,=0,1,2, (3.2)
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whs ITS
Hj=£[^]=A(l-e^4 )-A(l-e-i, y-1)A ) , (3.2a)
=Xe^^'-1)A (l-e->lA ) . (3.2b)
The parameters [i and X are estimated by maximum likelihood.
The likelihood function is
L(X / n)=TTJ e^i^ . (3.3)





. +J^=i ^.ln(X i ) . (3.4)
The partial derivatives of l(\,fi) with respect to X and /i are
taken and set equal to zero. This allows X to be written in
terms of \i and n(t
s
), the total number of counts to occur up
to time t,, as
,
, .
X._E<*2 > . (3 . 5)(l-e^ 5
X is substituted into the partial derivative of 1 with respect
to /x to give,
dl/d\iL =-n(ts)-£ -Afl(tJ+ 2 r— =0 , (3.6)
l-e"^ tB l-e^ A
where
^^E^ O'-D^ (3.7)





This equation closely resembles Schneidewind' s result; see
(2.41). Since t
9
=AJ, equation (3.8) becomes
ha jg-nt, n (tJ
then,
(3.9)
=j. (e^) J +R^A=r . (3.10)-HA
l-e"^ A l-(e~^) J n(ta )
By letting x=e*'*A into equation (3.10) becomes,
x T x J . n(t_)
=<7-^— + g =r ; (3.11)1-x i-x J n(t8 )
x is solved for iteratively. Let J=0 for the first iteration,
then




x(1)=__iL^ .^£(1^ . (3.13)






x(2) is given by,
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x(2)= r( ^j. . (3.15)l+r(2)
Hence the iteration of r(n) and x(n) is
X{n) J




x(n + l)= r{ " +1 \, . (3.17)1+r (n+1)
The iterative process continues until x(n+l) -x(n) < e, where
€
is a suitable small number; x(n+l) is then substituted into
equation (3.5) to get X. Using the estimates of Ji and X, the
expected number of faults to be observed in some additional
operating time t 0/ where (t s/ t 8+t ) is of length kA, can be
estimated
E[N(t )-N(ts)]=n(t s ) {
e
*'
(l-e-^A )} . (3.19)
l-e"p "
A Bayesian methodology is discussed in the appendix. This
method attempts to utilize past experience from software
projects having similar characteristics as the software in
question. If the distributions of X and p are known from
experience then this information can be useful in estimating
the parameters X and Ji.
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B . BOOTSTRAP
Bootstrapping was used to obtain the confidence limits for
p., X, and E[N(t ) -N(t,)] = E[AN(t )]. This technique takes
into account the sampling uncertainties in the estimates by
removing the errors in the standard approximation (Dalai et
al, 1989) and (Efron, 1985) . To obtain the estimates of the
sampling variability of ji, X, and E [N (t ) -N(t
s ) ] =E [A(t ) ]
proceed as follows. The probability that a count occurs in




PiN^n^ JVJ=nJ |iV1 +tf2 +. . .+Nj=n(ts)) (3.20a)
where EX,= l-e- jMA . From this the probability that a count falls
in the jth interval is
P, = ±-^ . 3.21
l-e"JpA
Uniform (0,1) random numbers were generated, where the
k=l, 2 , . . , n (t 8 ) ; Uk is the kth random number. If P(j.1)<UkssPj then
a count is added to n
:
. The simulated Uj's were then used to
re-estimate p., X, and E[AN(t )]; these are the bootstrap
values. This process was repeated 1000 times to get a range
of values for ji, X, and E[AN(t )] . To create a 90% confidence
limit of the estimate E[AN(t )] the 1000 bootstrap estimates
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of E[AN(t )] were ordered and the values of the 50th and 950th
quant iles were found. These are quoted as the 9 0% confidence
region (E[AN(t )] 5 , E [AN (t ) ] 95 ) .
C . RESULTS
The estimates for the parameters were obtained using three
different A values and three different t
s
values. The value
t was selected such that t + t, «= time of last observed fault
to occur; this allows for comparison of the predicted expected
number of faults to occur with the observed data. The data
provided in Tables 1 through 6 are the 90% confidence interval
obtained by the bootstrap. The most difficult aspect of this
thesis research was obtaining appropriate test data. The
data that I received from various sources was unacceptable for
various reasons: no testing history, severity of faults not
listed, no milestone events listed (i.e. one data set covered
10 years but no indication of modifications to the software)
,
non- software errors listed with software errors, description
of errors could not be interpreted (which may have eliminated
some of the problems mentioned above) . The underlying cause
of this is that organizations that I contacted for data do not
use any systematic method for determining software
reliability. A "warm fuzzy feeling" for the software seems to
be the current method used to judge the reliability of the
software. This feeling gets warmer and fuzzier as deadlines
draw closer. The data sets used in the analysis of the model
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were obtained from a technical report on other software
reliability models (Abdalla et. al . , 1986). The data was
given as time (CPU) between failures. The results of the
bootstrap for Data Set 1 are given in Tables 1-3; the
graphical results (Dalai, 1990) are depicted in Figures 1-3.
The results of the bootstrap for Data Set 2 are given in
Tables 4-6; the graphical results (Dalai, 1990) are depicted
in Figures 4-5.
D. USE OF RESULTS
Suppose a time t 8 has been spent testing the software, and
n(t
s ) faults were found. The n(t s ) faults can be broken up
into n/s, the number of faults in each period j of size A (Enj
= n(tj). This information can be used to estimate the
parameters Ji and X, and a point estimate of the mean or
expected number of faults to appear in the time interval (t 8 ,
t
s
+t ) . Operational testing of the system will require some
time t . Bootstrapping can now be done to assess the sampling
uncertainty in the estimate of the expected number of faults
to appear in (t
s ,
t 8+tj . This will be done by quoting
bootstrapped 90% confidence limits. The expected number of
faults predicted to occur can be compared to the requirements
of the system i.e. for some time t for example; at most F
faults are allowed (suppose F can be specified) . If the
predicted expected number of faults is less than the allowable
number of faults then system operational testing might be
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worth the expense at this time. In contrast to this, if the
expected number of faults is greater than the specified number
of faults then system operational testing should be postponed.
Testing should continue in the lab, at the developmental level
until t„ and n(t,) are large enough that the expected number of
faults for the required operational time meets specification.
A more conservative approach is to replace the estimate of
the mean number of faults by the upper confidence limit of the
mean number of faults. Such a conservative approach is
recommended.
If there are no specifications the individual responsible
for scheduling system operational testing will have to make a





+t ) small enough to warrant spending the money
to carry out system operational testing, or should this
testing be postponed until the expected number of faults is
lower. The assumption is that lab testing will continue on
the software, increasing t
s
and n(t
8 ), but reducing the number
of unfound and uncorrected faults. The more faults found in
lab testing of the software the fewer the number of faults
that are likely to occur in the more costly system operational
testing.
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E. APPLICATION TO TWO DATA SETS
The fitting and error assessment procedure was applied to
two data sets (Abdalla et al, 1986). Figures 1, 2, and 3
refer to Data Set 1; Figures 4, 5, and 6 to Data Set 2.
Figure 1 has a A of 10 CPU minutes with three combinations
of t
s
and t . If the range of the expected number of faults
for t 8=1250, t o=250 (2.21 to 6.09) is acceptable the software
manager may choose to schedule operational testing. The same
argument can be made for t
8
=1000, t o=500. A problem occurs for
t
8
=500 and to=1000. If the range for the expected number of
faults to occur (4.69 to 22.22) is acceptable the software
manager may choose to schedule operational testing.
Unfortunately, 46 faults occur in (t 8/ t 8+t ) . This is
extremely likely to be the result of use of an inappropriate
model (it does seem unlikely that software with as many as 22
mission- critical faults would be viewed as acceptable for
starting operational testing) . What can the software manager
do to prevent something like this from occurring? Ideally, as
testing continues, the rate at which faults occur should
decrease (assuming a constant relative rate of testing) , with
that rate asymptotically approaching zero as t 8 becomes large.
The slope of the estimated total expected number of faults
verses test time for Data Set 1 from T=300 to T=500 is m=0.08
(faults/cpu min) . Figure 1 depicts this: the rate at which
faults are occurring does not appear to be tapering off. The
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software manager can use this information to support a
decision to go ahead with (or postpone) operational testing.
From T=1000 to T=1500 the slope is 0.028 (faults/cpu min) and
appears to be tapering off. The range of the expected number
of faults to occur in the specified t accurately reflect what
actually occurred. If the range of the expected number of
faults is acceptable the software manager should go ahead with
operational testing. Figure 2 (A = 20 cpu minutes) and Figure
3 (A = 50 cpu minutes) can be interpreted similarly.
The change in A for both data sets did not have a
significant impact on the range of the expected number of
faults to occur, indicating that the model is somewhat
insensitive to the size of A.
Data Set 2 (Figures 4,5, and 6) shows only a small
indication of the slope decreasing. This is why the
confidence limits of the expected number of faults is so wide.
The software manager can apply the same techniques listed
above to make a decision to schedule (or postpone) operational
testing. The software manager must repeatedly address the
questions: is the rate of occurrence of faults lessening, and
is the range of expected number of faults acceptable to
support operational testing?
A fitted model may indicate a narrowing range of expected
number of faults and slope asymptotically approaching zero,
consequently the software manager schedules operational
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testing. Unfortunately, the results of the operational
testing may be poor i.e. a relatively large number of errors
may occur indicating that more developmental activity and
testing is required to improve the software. For example, the
model predicts n(t )-22 for Data Set 1 (t,=500, t o=1000) , but
the number of observed faults that occurred in t was more
than twice the predicted amount, 46. This example illustrates
the relationship between modeling and testing. While a
systematic underestimation indicates flaws in the model,
occasional underestimation simply reinforce that software
reliability models do not take the place of stressing software
within a full system in a real -life operational environment.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the software manager
with a tool to aid in the decision as to when to initiate
operational testing, not to replace such a test.
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 1
t,«1250, to=250 (CPU MINUTES)
Observed number of bugs in t is 6
90% Confidence Interval


























ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 1
t,= 1000, t o=500 (CPU MINUTES)
Observed number of bugs in t is 14
90% Confidence Interval


























ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 1
t,= 500, t o=1000 (CPU MINUTES)
Observed number of bugs in t is 46
90% Confidence Interval



























ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 2
t,= 800, to=300 (CPU SECONDS)
Observed number of bugs in t is 12
90% Confidence Interval


























ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 2
t,= 600, t o=500 (CPU SECONDS)
Observed number of bugs in t is 21
90% Confidence Interval


























ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 2
t 8=400, t o=700 (CPU SECONDS)
Observed number of bugs in t is 37
90% Confidence Interval


























Figure 1. Data Set 1, A = 10 (CPU minutes)
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Figure 6. Data Set 2, A = 50 (CPU seconds)
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IV. CONCLUSION
Software reliability models are useful tools that managers
of software intensive projects have at their disposal. The
bootstrapping technique will provide the manager a range of
expected number of faults estimated to occur for some
additional operating time. The question is, is the upper
limit of the expected number of faults estimated to occur
acceptable? The potential risks are additional cost for
further testing or late product delivery. The ideal case is
reliable software delivered on time and on budget.
Unfortunately, reality is rarely ideal. The software manager
must decide: is it better to deliver a product on time that
may be considered unreliable by the user and be sent back for
further testing, or to deliver a product late but of
acceptable quality to the user? The purpose of this thesis is
to provide a quantitative tool for the manager who may have to
make such qualitative decisions. The use of software
reliability models is not without associated cost, and risk.
The data must be collected for input to the model.
Recommendations for the type of data that should be collected
are:
• Operating time between failures (CPU time is the best)
(Musa and Okumoto, 19 84)
.
• Calendar time between failures, although such times may
not accurately reflect the opportunity for faults to
reveal themselves (Musa et al, 1987).
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• Testing history i.e. how many people are involved in the
testing effort.
• How the software was tested
• Intensity of the software testing
• Cost of testing i.e. the cost to find and repair a fault
before and after product delivery.
Without useful data a reliability model has little
practical use. The model presented in this thesis should be
validated using data from several Navy systems.
There are several areas for further research. How
accurate are the predicted confidence limits in this model?
What are the limits of applicability of this model? What
effect do inaccuracies (due to replacing observed data with
hypothesized data in cases where insufficient data is
available) have on the model i.e. how robust is the model?
Further development of other software reliability models
should be pursued. Emphasis should be placed on obtaining
confidence limits in addition to quoting only a point estimate
of the expected number of failures predicted to appear for
some additional testing time. These models should be verified
using data obtained from Navy software intensive systems. It
is infeasible to test every possible branch in a large program
for faults. The software manager needs technical assistance
in identifying where effort and money should be spent to
deliver the best possible product. Will many faults in
portions of the software that are rarely used/reached cause
44




Software projects may have similar characteristics such as
testing strategies or architecture, so that the information
obtained about the reliability of one software project may be
used to aid in the prediction of the reliability of another
similar, software project. This process can make use of
Bayesian methodology (Dalai and Mallows, 1990) , (Farr, 1983)
.
If prior distributions of X and \l are specified then this
information can be used help estimate the parameters X and fi;
the posterior for these is
pAiU U,\L)=KL(k,\i)pA (X)pu (\i) , (a. la)
(a. lb)
where p*(X) and pp (^i) are the prior distributions of X and jx
estimated from another software project that has
characteristics similar to the software project currently
being tested. The simplest idea is to integrate out X and
marginalize on y. which yields:
p <|i) =jd*V*< 1-e
*" t
'> Xalt'] pA (X) dk-e-^
u
'
] (l-e-^) n{t ' ] . (a. 2)
J
46
The most convenient choice of p^fX) is the (conjugate) Gamma
p* a) = e ~°xAT(wr (a - 3)
which when substituted into equation (a. 2) yields the density,
* Jo r(p)
(a. 4a)
=K ,e -^nu5 ) (1 _ e -,A).(ts) r- e'z^^dz (a>4b)
Jo (a + l-e"^AJ ) ri(ts) +p
=jr//e -HAn( ts ) (1 _ e .^ )n (tfi ) 1 _
(a +l-e^AJ ) n(ts)+p
Using an uninformative prior, a=0, j3=0, and setting x=e'flA
equation (a. 4c) becomes
p^x)=K*x~n{t^(l-x) n{^ X
n(t .. . (a. 5)1
(cc +l-x J ) n(tff) *
The mode of the density is
T(x)=ln(p^(x))=H(t
s
)lnx+n(t s)ln(l-x)-(n(t s)+P)ln(a+l-x J ) .
(a. 6)




s ) x fl(ts)+P Jx
x
n(ta ) 1-x n{t g ) a+l-x 17
"
!a.7)
If a=/?=0 equation (a. 7) is the same as equation (3.11), which
gives the MLE.
Suppose m=E [X] and a2 = Var [X] in the prior, then a = m/a2 and






3 ) (a Q)
1-x n(t
3 ) (m/u2 )+l-x J n{ts )
If X is interpreted as the total number of faults in a
particular software project, then the number of faults is
discrete so a discrete distribution should be used for the
prior, i.e. one could use a Poisson for the prior. However,
it is easier to work with a Gamma distribution. If the Gamma
distribution has same parameters as a Poisson then equation








s ) (a g)
1-x n(t
s
) 2 -x J n(t3 )
It is clear that the variance to mean ratio of the prior has
strong influence on the effect of a prior estimate of the
mean
.
One Bayesian approach to estimation is to find the mean
(rather than the mode, or highest point of the posterior as is
essentially done in the likelihood approach) of the
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(approximate) posterior, Osxsl. To obtain an approximate
posterior mode proceed as follows. If J is large xJ is small
provided x>0, so expand in Taylor's series to get




where: n=n(t g ) and n =n (t t ) .
Equation (a. 10) is a convex combination of two beta densities.
K" can be found by setting the left hand side of (a. 11) = 1.
E [x] = E[e""A ] can be found,
pr>[ r(^i)r(M) ji+i (all)
T(n+n+l) n+n+1
, n+p v T(n+J+l)T(n + l) n+J+1 ,
l + a T(n+J+n+l) n+J+n+l
The approximation to this is
n\ n+1 n+P (n+J) ! n+J+1




(n+n) ! l +a (}^+J+^) !
Unfortunately, n=n(t 8 )=136 for Data Set 1; even with factoring
out n=n(t s ) , the factorial ratios are on the order of 10"300 .
However, it is justifiable to use an approximation to the
factorials to get _ „ _ _
73+1
+
n+p n+J+1 / n+1 > j
~ n+n+l l +a n+n+J+1 n+n+1 ,_ ,
-, xX" = . (a.iJ)
1+ n+l ( _n+l yl+a n+n+1
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The numerical results of equation (a. 13) are in Tables Al
through A6 for Data Sets 1 and 2. The graphical results are
shown in Figures Al through A6 . The range of the estimated
number of faults to occur in (t s# t g+t ) is much smaller than
that of the bootstrap results discussed in Chapter III. None
of the results (estimated number of faults to occur) using the
Bayesian method contain the observed faults. A possible
explanation for this is inappropriate values for ck and /3
(a=/3=0) . After various projects have been analyzed with
software reliability models, fault distribution may become
more apparent. This information can then be incorporated to
reliability models. I feel that, despite the surprising
initial results, this method does promise to be a useful tool
to the software manager.
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TABLE Al
BAYESIAN ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 1
t,=1250, to=250 (CPU MINUTES)
Observed number of bugs in t is 6
90% Confidence Interval


























BAYESIAN ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 1
t
8
=1000, t o=500 (CPU MINUTES)
Observed number of bugs in t is 14
9 0% Confidence Interval


























BAYESIAN ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 1
t
8
=500, t o=1000 (CPU MINUTES)
Observed number of bugs in t is 4 6
90% Confidence Interval



























BAYESIAN ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA
t,= 800, to=300 (CPU SECONDS)
Observed number of bugs in t is 12
90% Confidence Interval
SET 2


























BAYESIAN ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 2
t 8=600, t o=500 (CPU SECONDS)
Observed number of bugs in t is 21
90% Confidence Interval


























BAYESIAN ESTIMATE OF PARAMETERS FOR DATA SET 2
t
8
=400, t o=700 (CPU SECONDS)
Observed number of bugs in t is 37
90% Confidence Interval
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Figure A2 . Data Set 1, A = 20 (CPU minutes), Bayesian Method
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Figrure A6 . Data Set 2, A = 50 (CPU seconds), Bayesian Method
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